Motivated by diverse applications in sharing economy and online marketplaces, we consider optimal pricing and matching control in a two-sided queueing system. We assume that heterogeneous customers and servers arrive to the system with price-dependent arrival rates. The compatibility between servers and customers is specified by a bipartite graph. Once a pair of customer and server are matched, they depart from the system instantaneously. The objective is to maximize long-run average profits of the system while minimizing average waiting time. We first propose a static pricing and max-weight matching policy, which achieves O(
Introduction
A two-sided queueing system is one where customers and servers both arrive and then wait in queues until they are matched. Many emerging applications and rapidly growing marketplaces can be modeled as such systems. Some examples include Uber and Lyft where passengers are matched with drivers, Grubhub where customers are matched with meal delivery couriers, and crowdsouring platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk where requesters are matched with contributors. Most of these platforms use both dynamic pricing and dynamic matching as levers to facilitate market profitability and efficiency.
In this paper, we consider a canonical model of a two-sided queuing systems with n types of servers and m types of customers. Each type of customer is allowed to be matched with only a subset of server types. For example, in the case of ride hailing system, the type of servers (cars) and passengers (customers) will be determined by their geographical locations. Customers and servers which are nearby will be compatible to be matched to each other.
At each point in time, the system operator sets a price for each type of customer and server. Then, customers who are willing to pay and servers who are willing to serve for the quoted price enter the system. They each wait in separate queues, until they are matched to a compatible counterpart. Once a pair is matched to each other, they will leave the system immediately in order to complete the service. The system operator earns a profit, which is equal to the difference between the price charged to the customer and the price quoted to the server.
We formulate the above system as a Markov decision process (MDP). The operator can vary the price for each type of customer and server, as well as decide when to match and which customerserver pair to match. The objective is to maximize the profits obtained by the system operator, while accounting for the queuing delay experienced by the customers and servers. We are especially interested in the behavior of systems with large traffic, as all of the arrival rates are scaled by a factor η → ∞. Under this scaling regime, any policy that is within o(η) of the optimal objective is asymptotically optimal.
The major challenge in this problem is the curse of dimensionality in solving the MDP. As the number of customer and server types increases, the dimension of the state space increases exponentially, even when the buffer size at each queue is finded to be a constant. Thus, it is intractable to solve the exact MDP for large scale systems, which are often encountered in practice. In this paper, we propose approximation technique to obtain near optimal solutions for the MDP efficiently. In addition, we propose dynamic pricing and matching policies that are asymptotically optimal.
In summary, the key contributions in the paper are the following:
• We model a bipartite two-sided queuing network with stochastic arrivals as a Markov decision process. In some special cases, we are able to show structural properties of the optimal dynamic pricing policy. • We present an approximation technique and a constraint generation algorithm to solve the MDP efficiently. The approximation sometimes leads to a closed-form expression of the pricing policy. • We analyze a fluid model. The revenue obtained by solving the fluid model is an upper bound on the achievable revenue under any policy. • We propose a fluid pricing and max-weight matching policy, and show that the revenue loss from the fluid revenue is O( √ η). Thus, it is asymptotically optimal. • We propose a two price and modified max-weight matching policy, and show that the revenue loss from the fluid revenue is reduced to O(η 1/3 ). • Finally, we present a simulation study to show additional insight into the optimal policy.
Literature Review
Dynamic Matching. Dynamic matching markets have widespread applications, for example, in ride sharing [4] , online marketplaces like Amazon.com or Ebay, kidney exchange [3, 15] , payment processing networks [16] , quantum entanglement switch [21, 22] . In these systems, achieving positive recurrence, which is a common notion of stability in queuing systems, is non-trivial. This is because unlike traditional queuing models, servers also arrive in the system, so an intricate balance must be established between the server arrival rate and customer arrival rate. In the literature, several ways to circumvent this issue have been proposed. Caldentey et al. [6] and Adan and Weiss [1] consider a simplified model with no arrivals which helps them analyze the underlying Markov chain and show positive recurrence. In the context of ride-hailing systems, Banerjee et al. [4, 5] study a closed queuing network, where the number of cars in the system is a constant and the customers abandon the system if they are not matched immediately. For payment processing networks, Sivaraman et al. [16] consider stability in the fluid limit (called rate stability), and not the positive recurrence of the system. Gurvich and Ward [7] analyze a general multi-sided queuing system (more than two sides may be present). The objective in that paper was to minimize finite time cost incurred due to queuing. Matching problems were also studied in the context of kidney exchanges albeit in a non-two-sided setting in [2, 3] . These papers study the value of "batching", i.e., holding compatible matching pairs in hope that better matching will arrive in future. However, both papers find that batching in general does not provide significant benefit. The work that considers a model closest to the one studied in this paper is by Hu and Zhou [9] . A a two-sided system is studied, but under a finite time horizon, and the goal is to mazimize the discounted reward obtained by matching the arriving customers and servers. However, while the focus of [9] was transcience, we focus on steady-state. Moreover, [9] does not consider the optimal pricing problem. A two sided model with both customer and server arrivals is studied in [13] . However, the customers and servers are allowed to abandon, which ensures stability. However, the focus in [13] was to establish process level convergence.
Dynamic Pricing. Dynamic pricing is a common mechanism for increasing revenue. Kim and Randhawa [11] and Banerjee et al. [5] study the benefit of dynamic pricing over static pricing in queuing system. Dynamic pricing mechanisms have also been extensively studied in revenue management literature in a more general setting [18] . In our model, we also use dynamic pricing as lever to increase system operator's profit while making the system stable. Note that dynamic pricing subsumes external control like abandonment of customers (by increasing the customer price to infinity). Also, we are able to show positive recurrence for the two-sided queues with dynamic pricing, which is a stronger notion of stability compared to rate stability in [16] .
Max-Weight Algorithm. In this work, we propose a max-weight matching algorithm for a two-sided queuing problem. This algorithm was first proposed by Tassiulas and Ephremides [20] in the context of communication networks. After that, the max-weight algorithm and the backpressure algorithm, which is a generalization of the max-weight algorithm, are studied intensively in the literature. The book by Srikant and Ying [17] provides an excellent summary. The performance of max-weight algorithm in the context of a switch operating in heavy traffic has been studied by Maguluri and Srikant [12] . The backpressure algorithm was used in the context of online ad matching in [19] and in the context of ride hailing in [10] .
Notation
Throughout the paper, vectors are boldfaced. We use ⟨., .⟩ for Euclidean dot product between two vectors. All the functions applied on a vector is component wise, e.g. F (λ) is defined to be (F (λ 1 ), . . . , F (λ m )). Moreover, a ≤ b means that all the components of a is less than or equal to corresponding components of b. In addition, we define the vector e (2) j and e (1) i as a vector with all zeros except a one for type j customer and type i server respectively. Throughout the paper, we use i and superscript (1) to denote a server type and j and superscript (2) to denote a customer type. We define E[.] for expected value of a random variable and the conditional expectation E[.|x] is written as E x [.] for the ease of notation. We denote 1, 2, . . . , n as [n]. We denote the vector with all 1's as 1 n with size n and we will sometimes omit the subscript if the size of the vector is clear from the context wherever it is used. In addition, we also define 0 n as the vector with all 0's of size n and we omit the subscript if the size of the vector is clear from the context. Next, for the vectors x ∈ R n and y ∈ R m , we denote the concatenated vector of n + m dimension by (x, y) and if x and y are of the same dimension, we denote the component wise product by x • y.
Model
We model the multiple types of customers and servers by a bipartite graph G(N 1 ∪ N 2 , E), where N 2 is the set of customers type with |N 2 | = m and N 1 is the set of server types with |N 1 | = n. Here, E are the set of edges in the bipartite graph between customer and server types which are compatible with each other. In other words, (i, j) ∈ E if type j customer can be served by type i server. Each vertex in the bipartite graph is a queue of customers/servers waiting to be matched with any one of the compatible counterpart.
Our convention is to refer the incoming demand as customers and incoming supply as server. Note that, unlike in a traditional queuing system, the servers and customers both arrive in a twosided queuing system. Once the customer is matched with a compatible server, they depart from the system instantaneously and the service is deemed to be complete. One of the major challenges in two-sided queues is to make the system stable, or in other words, make the underlying Markov chain positive recurrent, where the state space of the underlying Markov chain is the queue lengths of all the types of customers and servers. We address this issue by employing the idea of dynamic pricing. Customers willing to pay the quoted price and the servers who are willing to provide their service for the quoted price are admitted in the system. Once they are admitted in the system, they wait in the queue until they are picked and matched by a compatible counterpart. Thus, the system operator can vary the prices of the customers and servers to vary their arrival rate to ensure that the system is positive recurrent. First come first serve service (FCFS) discipline is employed separately for each queue. Note that, FCFS may not hold among different type of customer/server, it will rather depend on the matching policy used. Now, the objective will be to find a pricing policy and the matching policy under which the system is positive recurrent and the system operator earns the maximum profit. First we will define the pricing and matching decisions that the system operator can take. Here pricing decisions governs the arrival process and the matching decisions governs the service process of our queuing system.
Whenever the system state is changed, the system operator sets a price p (2) j , ∀j ∈ [m] for type j customer which results in an arrival rate λ j of the customer determined by the respective demand curve F j : λ j → p (2) j , ∀j ∈ [m]. Similarly, the system operator sets a price denoted by p (1) i , ∀i ∈ [n] for type i server which results in an arrival rate µ i of the server determined by the respective supply curve G i : µ i → p (1) i . We assume that the customer and server then arrive according to Poisson processes with rate λ ∈ R m + and µ ∈ R n + respectively. We make the following assumption on the supply and demand curve:
are monotonically increasing continuous, differentiable and one-one function and the demand curve F j , ∀j ∈ [m] are monotonically decreasing continuous, differentiable and one-one function.
This assumption is very standard in the economic literature. It says that offering higher price to the servers will result in higher server arrival rate and offering the service for lower prices will result in higher customer arrival rate.
Other than the price, the system operator determines matching decisions each time the system state is changed. We denote by x i j , the number of type i server, matched to type j customer. Note that the number of matching x i j , ∀i ∈ N 1 , ∀j ∈ N 2 cannot be more than number of type i servers and number of type j customers currently waiting in the queue. Also, we cannot match i to j if (i, j) E. Thus we have,
x
where q (2) j is the number of type j customers waiting in the queue at the time of the matching decision and q (1) i is the number of type i servers waiting in the queue at the time of the matching decision.
The set of all x ∈ R m+n + which satisfies (1), (2) and (3) are the set of feasible matching which we denote by X (q). Note that we restrict ourselves to only stationary pricing and matching policy, i.e. the pricing and matching decisions do not depend on the time but only depend on the state of the system.
We define this process as a continuous time Markov decision process (CTMDP). First, we formally define stability of our queuing system below:
Definition 2.1. The continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) operating under a pricing and matching policy is said to be stable if the communicating class containing zero is positive recurrent. Now, we will define the decision epoch, state, action, reward and objective of our MDP below.
Decision Epoch: Every time there is an arrival of any one of the customer or server type. Rewards: The system operator will receive a reward (based on the state of the system and the actions) at each decision epoch. With every customer arrival, the system operator earns a reward equal to the price set for that customer type and similarly, the system operator bears a cost with each server arrival. In addition to this, the system operator incurs a cost proportional to the number of customers and servers waiting in the system per unit time.
State space: (S) We define our state space as the communicating class which contains zero. If for a pricing policy, λ > 0 m and µ > 0 n for all queue lengths q, then the state space will be q ∈ Z n+m + . We are only interested in the pricing policies under which the communicating class which contains zero is positive recurrent. This is because we are interested only in the pricing policies which makes the system stable and clearly if we are in the communicating class containing zero, then the cost incurred due to waiting of the customers and servers will be minimum. Based on this definition of the state space, our underlying continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) for any pricing policy will be irreducible.
Action space: By Assumption 1, price and arrival rate has a oneone correspondence. Thus, rather than using price as the action, we equivalently use arrival rates λ(q), µ(q) for all q ∈ S as the action with λ j ∈ dom(F j ) for all j ∈ [m] and µ i ∈ dom(G i ) for all i ∈ [n]. Here, dom(F ) is the domain of the function F . In addition, the matching policy x(q) ∈ X (q) are also in the action space. Thus action is a tuple (λ, µ, x) ∈ R 2(m+n) .
Objective: The objective is to determine a pricing and matching policy such that the long term average revenue earned by the system operator is maximized.
The MDP advances as follows:
• Each time the state of the system is changed, we match customers and servers, i.e. we set x ∈ X (q). If x = 0 m+n , then no customer-server pairs have been matched. • Immediately after matching, we set the price for each customer and server type. • Now based on the prices set, the further type j customer arrival follows Poisson(λ j ) for all j ∈ [m] and type i server arrival follows Poisson(µ i ) for all i ∈ [n].
To study the CTMDP we use the uniformization technique [14] to obtain a discrete-time Markov Decision Process chain (DTMDP) which we analyse. It is well-known that the stationary distributions of both the MDPs are the same under any policy. The uniformized process is as follows.
We couple the Uniformized discrete-time Markov Decision Process (UDT-MDP) with the CTMDP in a way that whenever there is an arrival in the CTMDP, there is a transition in the UDT-MDP and there are some additional transitions in the UDT-MDP to the same state. Thus, there is an arrival of type j customer with probability λ j c , and there is an arrival of type i server with probability µ i c , where c is greater than the maximum possible sums of arrival rates of all the customers and servers. To define c we first make an assumption on the supply and demand curve below. Assumption 2. There exists λ max and µ max such that for any price vector p we have,
We pick c such that
We will now define an arrival and service process for the UDT-MDP.
Let a(k) ∈ {0, 1} m+n be an arrival process, which represents the arrival of the customers and servers as we have one transition in the uniformized process. As the probability of having multiple arrivals at the same time for a continuous time process is zero, at most one component of a(k) will be non zero. Thus, the arrival process has the following distribution:
Every time the system state changes, the operator is allowed to match customers and servers. Thus, we define the service process x as follows:x
With an abuse of notation, we use x(k) to represent x(q(k) + a(k)). Now we have defined an arrival process and a service process ( matching decisions) of the two-sided queuing system. For the ease of notation, we define vectors of the queue lengths, arrival and service process as
The queue length advancement equation is the relation between the queue length before a transition q(k) and the queue length after a transition q(k + 1) in the UDT-MDP. We have
Rather than keeping track of the trajectory of the queue length of the continuous process, it suffices to keep track of the queue length for the uniformized discrete time process. We will work with this discrete time process in the following sections. To find the optimal pricing and matching policy, we start by writing the Bellman equation for the infinite horizon average cost CTMDP.
Using the uniformization technique and denoting Z (q) as the set of feasible matching, h(q) as the value function associated with each state and д as the conjectured value of the optimal average cost, the Bellman equation can be written as
where
j − x(k))
i − x(k))
where z is the action vector which includes λ, µ and x ∈ X (q) and Z (q) is the set of feasible action vectors. In the Bellman equation, R(q, z) is the expected revenue for the state q and action z. The revenue term is the net of what the customer pays and server gets along with a penalty proportional to the sum of the queue lengths. Also, E q,z [V (h, q, z)] is the expected value of the value function h after one transition in the uniformized process where q is the queue length, z is the chosen action at the current decision epoch and the expectation is with respect to the transition matrix of the UDT-MDP. Here, c is the uniformization constant chosen arbitrarily such that it satisfies (4) . Finally, to computationally solve the MDP, we restrict ourselves to a finite state space denoted by S and given by q ≤ b1 m+n , where in all practical applications, b is chosen to be very large such that under the optimal pricing policy P[q
are very small for all j ∈ [m] and i ∈ [n]. Although, our technical results does not require the finite state space condition.
In the MDP, we are allowing to do the matching each time the state of the system is changed, thus whenever there is an arrival, we have the term x which corresponds to the matching that have been performed just after the arrival. X (q) is the set of feasible matching for the system state q.
Assumptions
We define the revenue and cost functions as r
. Now, we will make the following assumption on the revenue and cost functions which are standard in the economics literature. i (.) satisfies the following conditions:
The assumption follows from the Law of Diminishing Marginal
Utility. If we interpret
as the probability of an arriving customer accepting the quoted price with λ max j being the exogenous arrival, the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility implies that the hazard rate of this distribution is non decreasing which implies that the revenue function r
Monotonicity of Prices (Single Link Two-Sided Queue)
In this section, we consider the special case of our model with n = 1 and m = 1, i.e. a single link two-sided queue given in Fig. 2 . In this system, there is no incentive for the operator to make the customer or server wait, so ,if possible, we will match the incoming arrival immediately. That is, the matching policy in this case is trivial. Thus, at any point of time, there can only be either customers or servers waiting in the system. This enables up to reduce the number of variables in the model by letting q = q (2) − q (1) , the difference between the number of customers and servers waiting in the system. Note that, q can be positive or negative. The goal in this section is to show structural properties of the optimal pricing policy by analyzing the Bellman equation. We start with presenting the Bellman equation for this special case. We have
where c is a uniformization constant which we take as c = λ max + µ max . Thus, by Assumption 2, the uniformization constant satisfies the required condition given by (4) . Here, as we have n = m = 1, we omit the subscripts for different type of customers and servers for the ease of notation. We now present the theorem below.
Theorem 3.1. There exists an optimal monotonically increasing customer and server pricing policy (p * (q)) for a single link two-sided queue.
To show this, we first show that the difference of value function h(q) − h(q − 1) is monotonically decreasing in q by an inductive argument on the iterates of the relative value iteration algorithm and then we use the optimality conditions on the Bellman equation to show that the optimal pricing policy is monotonic. The formal proof can be found in Appendix A.
This results allows us to search for the stationary optimal pricing policy in the restricted space of monotonically increasing pricing policies. In the next section, we will present a method to solve the MDP approximately to get the approximated optimal pricing policy.
LP Formulation
In this section, we present the optimization program corresponding to the MDP defined in the Section 2. We argue that solving this optimization program is computationally hard as the number of variables, which is equal to the number of states defined in the MDP, is large and constraints are uncountably many due to the continuous action space. To deal with the number of variables we show that by approximation of the value function by a polynomial in queue lengths gives us an upper bound on the long run average revenue. Using this approximation of the value function, we can find the approximated pricing policy using the optimality conditions for the MDP for a given matching policy. To deal with the uncountable constraints, we present a constraint generation algorithm which allows us to solve the optimization problem by solving multiple linear programs (LP).
Polynomial Approximation
The Optimization problem to solve the MDP is:
where R(., .) is defined in (8) and E q,z [V (h, q, z)] is defined in (9) . In the action space, λ and µ are continuous. As we have one inequality for each state-action pair, we have an uncountable number of constraints in this optimization problem. To formulate and solve it as an LP, we need to have finite number of constraints. To do that, we can discretize the action space which will lead to only a finite number of choices for λ and µ. But, this may lead to inaccurate solutions if the discretization is coarse or it will be computationally cumbersome if the discretization is fine. Also, as we have a value function for every unique q in the state space, we have in total b m+n number of variables which can be quite high even for small buffer value b. Thus, it will be computationally hard to solve this proposed optimization problem. To deal with these issues, we will use approximations of the value function which will drastically reduce the number of variables in the optimization problem. Also, later in this section, we present a constraint generation algorithm which deals with the uncountable number of constraints in the optimization problem.
Proposition 4.1. Approximating the value function h(q) with a polynomial in q of degree r give by:
for some finite r ∈ Z + and solving the optimization problem (13), (14) gives an upper bound on the average revenue д. Here, b l is the defined as the vector (b
The proof is based on the analysis of the minimization problem to solve the MDP. It uses the idea that if we minimize over a subset of the feasible region, then it will lead to higher values of the optimal objective function value and is deferred to Appendix B.
By approximating the value function by a polynomial of the queue length of degree r , we have reduced the number of variables in the optimization problem from b m+n to just (m + n) × r which is linear in m and n if r is a constant. We will later see that this approximation reduces the computational time drastically.
Also, as the degree of the polynomial increases, we consider a more general case, and thus the upper bound we obtain on the average revenue will be tighter as r increases. The system operator can choose this r to balance the trade off between accuracy of the solution and the computational time.
Another useful feature of this approximation is that, if we fix a stationary matching policy x(q), then we can use the optimality equations for the Bellman equation (7) to compute the closed form expression of the approximated pricing policy by solving the following differential equations:
These optimality equations are only valid when we are strictly in the interior of the feasible region of the optimization problem, i.e. λ > 0 m and µ > 0 n . Although, if there exists a q (2) j 0 for which λ j (q (2) j 0 ) = 0 then we can restrict our state space to q (2) j ≤ q (2) j 0 as the arrival rate of that type of customer for q (2) j 0 is 0 and thus, it is not possible to have q
Fluid Approximation
We will now present a fluid model which is a first order approximation for this system. We define χ i j as the rate of type i server matched to the type j customer for all (i, j) ∈ E. This can be interpreted as the long run average number of customer-server pair matched using the link (i, j). We also defineλ andμ as the effective arrival rate of the customers and servers respectively given by E[λ(q)] and E[µ(q)], where the expectation is with respect to the stationary distribution of the CTMC operating under the given pricing and matching policy. Now, we can write the deterministic optimization problem to maximize the average long run revenue as
subject to,λ
Here, Equation (17) (and (18)) is the rate balance of the incoming customers (servers) and the total customers (servers) that are matched to their counterpart. Also, (19) allows only the matching of a compatible customer-server pair. Intuitively, it is easy to see that these constraints are necessary because if the rates do not match then the waiting customer or server will keep accumulating over time. Moreover, these are not sufficient conditions to make the system stable as two-sided queues are inherently unstable as discussed in Section 2. Thus, if we solve this optimization program to maximize the revenue, we will get an upper bound on the achievable revenue under any pricing and matching policy which makes the system stable. Now, we will show that these are necessary but not sufficient constraints to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. The optimal objective function value (16) obtained by solving the fluid problem (16)- (19) gives an upper bound on the optimal average revenue under any pricing and matching policy which makes the system stable.
Idea of the Proof. We first show that under any pricing and matching policy, the constraints in the fluid problem are necessary but not sufficient conditions. Intuitively, the average arrival rates of customers and servers should be able to balance each other out. Next, we show that the average revenue obtained under any pricing and matching policy is less than equal to the fluid objective function. These two conditions together implies that fluid problem will give us an upper bound on the revenue obtained under any pricing and matching policy. The formal proof can be found in Appendix C. □
Constraint Generation
In this section, we present the constraint generation technique to solve the optimization problem (13)-(14) after we have approximated the differential value function by a polynomial function in q.
The constraint generation algorithm is as follows:
We initialize the variables {b l , l ∈ [r ]}, which are the coefficients of the polynomial approximation of the value function and the master LP with objective function "min д" and no constraints. In each iteration, we find the most violating constraint for each q by solving the following sub-problem
Note that, the sub-problem can be decomposed into multiple convex optimization problem with respect to λ and µ. We then add these most violating constraints to the master-problem. We then solve the master-problem to get the updated values of b l ∀l ∈ [r ] and д. This process is repeated until the following criterion is met:
continue else 10:
end if end for 14:
# Master-Problem k=k+1 16 :
where k and k + 1 are successive iterates obtained by repeating the constraint generation algorithm and ϵ is the allowable tolerance.
The computational efficiency of the constraint generation algorithm can be further improved as follows: fix a matching policy and only solve for the customer and server prices to get the most violating constraint. Now, the sub-problem (20) is to maximize with respect to only customer and server arrival rates λ and µ. This will become an unconstrained, convex optimization problem which can be decomposed for the different customer and server arrival rates. In the next section, we present a matching policy which can be used for the same.
Asymptotic Optimality of Fluid Solution
In this section, we study the system in the regime where the arrival rates of all the customer and server types are scaled by a factor of η. We show that the fluid solution, which is an upper bound on the revenue of the ride hailing system, can be attained in the asymptotic regime η → ∞. We consider a policy where matching is done according to the MaxWeight policy that we will define. Pricing is done according to the optimal fluid prices. Moreover, we assume that the buffer capacity q η max can be scaled as a function of η. In this setting, we show that the loss of revenue compared to the optimal policy is at most O( √ η). We do this by first establishing that the revenue loss under fluid pricing policy in a single link two-sided queue is Θ( √ η) after picking a specific q max as a function of η.
We consider the fluid pricing policy, i.e. the prices for all the customer and server types are constant. Thus, the arrival rates are also constant. The optimal arrival rates are obtained by solving the fluid LP (16), (17) , (18) and (19) . In other words, λ and µ are such that it maximizes the revenue ⟨F (λ), λ⟩ − ⟨G(µ), µ⟩ and they belong to the set C, where the set is defined as,
We denote the maximizer by λ * , µ * ∈ C E . The pricing policy is
where q max is a design parameter which can be chosen carefully to optimize the policy to maximize the revenue. The matching policy we define is as follows: The system operator is allowed to match every time the system state changes. Whenever there is an arrival, if any of the compatible counterparts of the arrival is waiting in the queue, then we match it to the type with most number of customers/servers waiting in that queue. On the other hand, if all the compatible counterparts' queues are empty, then we can't match it to anyone and that arrival will then wait in the queue until in the future, some other arrival is matched to it.
We define y
i j (k) ∈ {0, 1} to be the decision of matching a type j customer to a type i server at the arrival of a type i server. Similarly, we also define y (2) i j (k) ∈ {0, 1} to be decision of matching a type i server to type j customer at the arrival of type j customer. Note that we will havex i j (k) = y (1) i j (k) + y (2) i j (k). We also define N (i) to be the set of all the counterparts of i such that they are compatible, i.e. for type i server, we have (i, j) ∈ E for all j ∈ N (i).
Algorithm 2 Max-Weight Matching Policy
Input: q(k), a(k) # k is a decision epoch 2: Initialization: y (1) (k) = 0 n , y (2) 
i (k) = 1 and max j ∈N (i) q
We will now analyze the resultant CTMC operating under the Fluid pricing and max-weight matching policy to quantify the revenue loss from the Fluid revenue R * . Before that, we define the asymptotic regime under which we will study the revenue loss and we also define the revenue loss below.
Definition 5.1 (Asymptotic Regime). Consider a family of CTMC parametrized by η such that for the η th CTMC, the demand and supply curve satisfy F η (ηλ) = F (λ) for all λ ∈ R m + and G η (ηµ) = G(µ) for all µ ∈ R n + . The asymptotic regime is defined as η → ∞.
Thus, the fluid optimal arrival rates for the η t h CTMC will be ηλ * and ηµ * where λ * , µ * is the optimal solution of the fluid problem (16)- (19) .
Definition 5.2 (Revenue Loss). The revenue loss for a policy, denoted by L η , is defined as the expected value of the difference of the fluid revenue R η * and the revenue obtained (including the penalty incurred due to waiting) when the CTMC is operating under the given policy.
The revenue loss for the fluid pricing policy can be calculated as follows: Whenever any queue length's buffer capacity is full, say q
max i , then all the future arrivals in i queue will be rejected until some of the servers waiting in i queue is matched and the queue length q (1) i becomes less than q η(1) max i . Thus, we will lose a fraction of revenue due to rejection of customers/servers due to the buffer capacity and it is exactly quantified by π (q η max ).
where π (q η(1)
max n ]) which will depend on the matching policy and parameters of the pricing policy.
If we increase the buffer capacity q η max , then the probability of dropping customers/servers will reduce, i.e. π (q η max ) will decrease. Although, increasing the buffer capacity will also lead to increasing the expected value of the queue lengths which will increase the penalty incurred due to waiting. Thus, there is a trade off and intuitively, choosing buffer capacity to balance the trade off will minimize the revenue loss.
First, we consider a single link two-sided queue (ϕ (1) (k), ϕ (2) (k)) operating under fluid pricing policy with a buffer capacity of ϕ η max for both the customers and servers. The arrivals are immediately matched upon arrivals if possible, otherwise they wait in the queue until they are matched. Thus, for any instance either the customer queue ϕ (1) or the server queue ϕ (2) is empty. Now, we will show that the optimal revenue loss for a family of single link two-sided queue parametrized by η upon scaling the buffer capacity appropriately is Θ( √ η). The proof of the proposition is straight forward and is presented in Appendix D.
Intuitively, the single link two-sided queuing system is a good model for a resource pooled multiple link two-sided queuing system as any incoming customer can be matched to any incoming server in a single link two-sided queue. So, we should expect that the single link two-sided queuing system gives an upper bound on a multiple link two-sided queuing system with same total arrivals and same pricing policy.
We will now show that the family of multiple link two-sided queues G (N 1 N 2 We only present the idea of the proof here and the proof details are deferred to Appendix E.
Idea of the Proof. We consider the η th system and bound the probability of dropping a customer and server in terms of q η max . To do this, we calculate the expression of π (q η max ) using the moment bound theorem [8] . Next, we bound the expected queue length by 1 m+n , q η max . Finally, we use these expressions to pick q max as Θ( √ η) and bound the revenue loss to get the theorem. □
Asymptotic Optimality of Two Price Policy
In this section, we present a two price policy that has a revenue loss of O(η 1/3 ). We first present a couple of definitions before presenting the two price policy. We start by defining a set C E + which is related to the set C E as follows:
Unlike C E , in C E + we need χ i j to be non zero for all (i, j) ∈ E. Note that, C E + ⊆ C E , so if λ * , µ * ∈ C E + then λ * , µ * ∈ C E but the converse may not be true. Also note that
We now define the minimal capacity serving graph and will work with this augmented version of the graph in this section.
Note that the above optimization problem is feasible for any given graph G(N 1 N 2 , E) as one of the feasible solution to the problem can be constructed as follows:
As (λ * , µ * ) ∈ C E , there exists χ * such that it satisfies the constraints in the definition of C (21) . Now just remove all the edges (i, j) ∈ E for which χ * i j = 0. When there exists multiple χ * , we pick the one with the smallest number of zeros to maximize the number of edges in E * . Also, there are finite number of subsets of E, so the maximum will be attained. Also note that as C E * + ⊆ C E * ⊆ C E , the fluid optimal solution for the graph G(N 1 N 2 , E * ) will be (λ * , µ * ).
We define N * (i) to be the set of compatible counterparts of the vertex i in the graph G(N 1 ∪ N 2 , E * ). In this section, we will work with the minimum capacity serving graph. Now we will define the pricing and matching policy below.
The pricing policy is a generalization of the fluid pricing policy. Here, we introduce additional parameters θ and ϕ which governs the arrival rates of the customers and servers respectively when the queue length is greater than a certain threshold q tp . As it is a generalization of the fluid policy, we expect a better performance if we choose the parameters carefully. The two price policy is given by the following:
Here, q η tp , θ η and ϕ η are parameters which can be chosen by the operator. In words, we set a threshold q η (2) tp j for a j type of customer, such that we use fluid arrival rates until this threshold and then reduce the arrival rates by θ Similarly, we reduce the server arrival rates outside a threshold. Our convention is to superscript any parameter or quantity by η which is associated with the η t h CTMC since these parameters can be chosen as functions of η.
For matching, we use max-weight policy on the graph G(N 1 ∪ N 2 , E * ) as described in Algorithm 2. We call this, the modified maxweight policy. In words, we will never match using the edges which are in E but not in E * . Now, we have defined the pricing policy and the matching policy under which the system operates. Now, we will present the theorem which states that the optimal two price policy is optimal and the asymptotic performance of this policy as η tends to infinity is better than the fluid policy. Theorem 6.2. For a family of multiple link two-sided queues with a given compatibility graph G(N 1 N 2 , E) parametrized by η operating under the two price policy and modified max-weight matching policy, the revenue loss L η due to stochasticity is O(η 1/3 ) for q η tp = T 1 η 1/3 , θ η = T 2 η 2/3 and ϕ η = T 3 η 2/3 for any vector of constants T 1 > 0 n+m , T 2 > 0 m and T 3 > 0 n .
The revenue loss due to stochasticity is O(η 1/3 ) which is better than the O( √ η) loss in the fluid pricing policy in Section 5. Note that, we can choose the constant factors T 1 , T 2 and T 3 carefully to optimize the revenue loss even further.
We will now present two lemmas which will assist us in proving the theorem. The first lemma shows that the CTMC parametrized by η is positive recurrent and the expected queue length is bounded which will be used later to bound the revenue loss. Lemma 6.3. For a system of two-sided queues operating under Two price policy and modified max-weight matching policy, the system is positive recurrent for any θ η > 0 m , ϕ η > 0 n and q η tp > 0 m+n and the expected queue length is bounded by the following equation:
The proof of the lemma is presented in the Appendix F. However, we present a brief idea of the proof here for better understanding of the reader.
Idea of the Proof. Since θ η and ϕ η are greater than zero, when the queue length of say, type j of customer or server is greater than its certain threshold q η tp j , the arrival rate of that type of customer decreases which leads to a drift towards 0. Therefore, we expect that the system is positive recurrent.
We prove this using the Foster Lyapunov Theorem [17] . We consider a quadratic Lyapunov function in queue lengths and show that the one step drift is negative outside a finite set of states. We then we use the Moment Bound Theorem [8] to bound the expected queue length. □
Now we know that all the members in the family of CTMC are positive recurrent. This is only possible when the arrival rates are in the set C. Now, we will use this idea and present another lemma which will be later used to eliminate terms in the revenue loss. The lemma is presented below. Lemma 6.4. For a system of two-sided queues operating under Two price policy and max-weight matching policy, for any θ η > 0 m , ϕ η > 0 n and q η tp > 0 m+n , we have
The proof of the lemma is deferred to Appendix G due to space constraints. We will present a brief sketch of the proof here for better understanding of the reader.
Idea of the Proof. We will use the fact that (λ * , µ * ) is the optimal solution of the Fluid optimization problem. To prove this lemma, we will use the first order optimality condition on the fluid optimization problem which says that the directional derivative of the objective function along a feasible direction is zero. We will use the arrival rates of the two price policy as another feasible point to find a feasible direction. Equating directional derivative to zero gives us the lemma. □
We will now present the idea for the proof of Theorem 6.2 and defer the details to Appendix H.
Idea of the Proof of Theorem 6.2. We will first upper bound the revenue loss defined in (22) , for the two price policy using Taylor series expansion. We will then use Lemma 6.4 to eliminate first order terms from the revenue loss and use Lemma 6.3 to bound the expected queue length. Finally, we will substitute q η tp , θ η and ϕ η in terms of η to get the result. □
Simulation
In this section we will present simulation results to verify the theorems presented before and to show the structural properties of the optimal pricing policies. We will only discuss the simulation results for a single link two-sided queue as it is the simplest case and will give us the most insight on the pricing policies. First we present the input data to the model which is used to analyze the system. For most of the results presented in this section, we use a supply curve given by p 1 = λ 0.5 and a demand curve given by p 2 = 4µ −0.5 . Solving the fluid solution, we get the fluid optimal revenue of 3.08, when λ = µ = 4 3 and p 1 = 1.15 and p 2 = 3.46. For most of the results, we cap the maximum queue length at 100 for both customers and servers as experiments pointed out that the expected queue length under optimal pricing policies is one order less than that.
Optimal Pricing Policy
Firstly, we present the optimal pricing policy obtained by solving the Average Reward, Continuous Time Markov Decision Process using the Relative Value Iteration which gives us ϵ optimal solution where we specify the tolerance to be 10 −4 . The system is simulated for different values of the penalty coefficient of the waiting customers and servers. Fig. 3 show the optimal pricing policy for three different values of the penalty coefficient (s). Note that, as s increases queue length is penalized more and so the price increases more steeply as the number of customers and servers waiting in the system increases. Also note that the customer price is always above the server price and both of them are monotonic so that the platform makes a profit on an average. It verifies the Theorem 3.1. Also note that, when the system is empty, the customer and server price matches the fluid prices as there is no penalty due to the waiting and the revenue maximization problem is the fluid problem. As the system has more customers, the customer price is increased to reduce the inflow of the customers and server price is increased to increase the inflow of servers to balance out the waiting customers in the system. As s increases, more weight is given to the penalty due to the waiting which leads to higher price in order to reduce the average number of waiting customers and servers.
The average revenue under the optimal pricing policies for different values of s values is presented in Fig. 4 . The average revenue decreases with the increase of s as more penalty is imposed for each waiting customer and server. Fig. 3 and Fig. 5 show that as s increases, the optimal pricing policy becomes steeper and the stationary distribution of the queue length is more concentrated around 0.
Linear Approximation
Now, we will present the results obtained by approximating the value function by a polynomial in the queue length and solving the approximate Markov Decision Process using constraint generation. We would like to point out that the implementation of the approximate MDP using constraint generation takes 2 orders of time less than solving the MDP using relative value iteration. Among the multiple experiments conducted, relative value iteration took 5 minutes on an average. On the other hand, approximated MDP was solved under 10 seconds.
We will now compare the pricing policy obtained by linear and quadratic approximation of the value function with that of the optimal pricing policy. As seen in Fig. 6 and 7 , for different values of s, the approximate pricing policy is a good first order approximation to the optimal pricing policy and with increasing the order of the polynomial, it results in a better fit. The linear approximation itself results in a way better fit than the fluid solution which gives only a static policy. We would also like to point out that by approximating the value function and solving for the unknown coefficients, results in a closed form expression of the pricing policy. Although, the shape of the approximate policy is sensitive to the function used to approximate the value function and the fit with the optimal pricing policy depends on the system parameters.
We compare the approximation of the value function by a linear function in queue length with the exact value function approximated as a linear function using regression. The comparison is summarized in Table 1 . The value function departs from a linear function to a more non linear function with increasing s which leads to increasing mismatch between the exact and approximated value function. Thus, the percentage error between the intercept and slope increases with the increasing value of s.
Moreover, we also compare the two by considering linear supply and demand curve. In particular, we consider the supply curve to be p 1 = µ and p 2 = 5 − λ. The comparison is summarized in Table 2 . Observe that the percentage error is less in the case of linear supply and demand curve, which shows that the quality of the fit depends on the system parameters.
In both the cases, we can also see that the average revenue (д) obtained by solving the approximated MDP results in an upper bound on the revenue obtained by solving the exact MDP. This verifies the Proposition 4.1.
Asymptotic Analysis
We compute the revenue loss under the fluid pricing policy and two price policy and compare it with the theoretical result presented before and also with the exact solution obtained by solving the MDP. The revenue loss under the fluid pricing policy follows √ η and that under the two price policy follows η 1/3 , verifying the Theorem 5.4 and Theorem 6.2. Also observe that the revenue loss under the two price policy is not very different from that of the optimal revenue loss, demonstrating the effectiveness of a two price policy. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a model of dynamic pricing and matching in a two-sided queueing system. We modeled it as an MDP, and presented an approximation framework and constraint generation algorithm. Next, we presented a fluid pricing and max-weight matching policy, and showed that it achieves O( √ η) optimality rate. Furthermore, we proposed a dyanmic pricing and modified max-weight policy, which achieves O(η 1/3 ) optimality rate. Our simulation results is consistent with our theoretical findings and show additional insights into the structure of the optimal policy. Table 2 : Comparison of Constraint Generation Algorithm with the optimal pricing policy with linear supply and demand curve The optimal customer and server pricing policy is obtained by solving the Bellman equation given by (12) .
Cons. Generation Value Iteration+Fit % Error
We will first show that the difference of the optimal value function, ∆h(q) = h(q) − h(q − 1) is monotonically decreasing in q. We will use the relative value iteration algorithm to compute the value function and show that in every iteration, the value function is monotonic where the value function at the end of k t h iteration is denoted by h k (q). The relative value iteration does the following computation:
for some q 0 ∈ S. Also, the Bellman equation can be rewritten using ∆h(q) as follows:
Now we will first present a lemma which is essential to prove the Theorem 3.1.
Lemma A.1. The optimal difference of value function ∆h * (q) is monotonically decreasing in q.
Proof. The proof by induction is presented below:
Base Case: As we can start with any initial value function to implement relative value iteration algorithm, we pick a monotonically decreasing difference of value function ∆h 0 (q) in q. Induction Hypothesis: Assume that ∆h k (q) is monotonically decreasing in q.
Induction
Step: We will now calculate ∆h k +1 (q +2)− ∆h k +1 (q +1) and show that it is always non negative. We have,
where ( * ) follows from the Bellman equation where R(µ * (q), λ * (q)) is the reward given by F (λ)λ − G(µ)µ − s |q| and (λ * (q 0 ), µ * (q 0 )) maximizes the Bellman equation (12) for q = q 0 . As (λ * (q 0 ), µ * (q 0 )) maximizes (12) for q = q 0 , we have:
R(µ * (q + 1),λ * (q + 1)) + λ * (q + 1)∆h k (q + 2) − µ * (q + 1)× ∆h k (q + 1) ≥ R(µ * (q + i), λ * (q + i)) + λ * (q + i)∆h k (q + 2)
Using, (30) to simplify (29) we get,
As c = λ max + µ max , we have c − µ * (q + 2) − λ * (q) ≥ 0 for all q and by Induction hypothesis, ∆h k (q + 1) − ∆h k (q) ≤ 0 for all q. Thus, ( * ) follows. This proves the lemma as relative value iteration preserves the monotonic behaviour of the value function and it converges to the optimal value and as the point-wise limit of monotonically decreasing functions is monotonically decreasing, ∆h(q) is monotonically decreasing and so h(q) is concave. □ Proof of Theorem 3.1. By Assumption 2, the domain of F is [0, λ max ] and the domain of G is [0, µ max ] and by Assumption 1, the equation we are maximizing in (12) is continuous and by Assumption 3 is it concave. Thus, we are maximizing a continuous concave function over a compact set. Thus, the maximizer exists and any point is a maximizer if and only if it satisfies the first order necessary condition.
First we will show that if λ * (q 0 ) = 0 then λ * (q) = 0 for all q > q 0 is an optimal decision rule. If λ * (q 0 ) = 0, then we have:
where ( * ) follows as ∆h is monotonically decreasing in q. The above inequality says that maximum value of F (λ)λ + ∆h(q 0 + k)λ is zero for all k ≥ 1, thus, λ = 0 is an optimizer for that. Now we will similarly show that if λ(q 0 ) = λ max then λ(q) = λ max for all q < q 0 is an optimal decision rule. We have,
Now, adding (∆h(q 0 − k) − ∆h(q 0 )) λ for some k > 0, we get:
where ( * ) follows as λ max ≥ λ. Thus, λ(q) = λ max will be an optimal decision rule for all q < q 0 . Thus, once the customer rate reaches it's maximum or minimum value, in the maximization problem (12) , it'll stay constantly that throughout.
Similarly, we can show that if µ * (q 0 ) = µ max then µ(q) = µ max for all q ≥ q 0 is an optimal pricing policy and if µ * (q 0 ) = 0 then µ(q) = 0 for all q ≤ q 0 is an optimal pricing policy. As it is quite repetitive, we omit the details here. Now, we will use the optimality condition for the optimization problem given by (12) when the optimal arrival rates are strictly in the interior of the constraint region, i.e. λ max > λ * (q) > 0 and µ max > µ * (q) > 0. We have,
where the gradient of the LHS is taken with respect to λ and µ respectively, which in turn depends on q. The gradient is well defined as F and G are continuous differentiable functions by Assumption 1. As ∆h(q) is monotonically decreasing in q by Lemma A.1, we have that (r (2) (λ * )) ′ = [F (λ * (q))λ * (q)] ′ and (r (1) (µ * )) ′ =
[G(µ * (q))µ * (q)] ′ are monotonically increasing. By Assumption 3, r (2) (λ * (q)) is concave in λ * and r (1) (µ * (q)) is convex in µ * . Thus, λ * should be monotonically decreasing in q and µ * should be monotonically increasing in q when λ * > 0 and µ * > 0 respectively. Thus, λ * (q) will be monotonically decreasing for all q and as the demand curve is monotonically decreasing by Assumption 1, the customer price (p (2) ) * (q) will be monotonically increasing.
Thus, µ * (q) will be monotonically increasing for all q and as the supply curve is monotonically increasing by Assumption 1, the server price (p (1) ) * (q) will be monotonically increasing. □
B Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Rewriting the Bellman equation using the approximation of the value function gives us the following optimization problem with finite variables and infinite constraints. 
The above defined h(q) along with д * will be a feasible solution to the optimization problem (13) (14) . Thus, the optimal value of (13) (14) will be less than or equal to д * . Thus, the proposition follows. □
C Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. Under a given pricing and matching policy, if E[q
, then R(q, z) = −∞ and the theorem is trivially true as the optimal objective function value (16) is greater than or equal to 0 asλ = 0 m andμ = 0 n is a trivial feasible solution of the fluid optimization problem. Now, we will consider a stationary pricing and matching policy under which E[q
Recall that we are interested in policies under which our CTMC is irreducible containing the state zero. Thus, if under a pricing and matching policy the system is stable, then we can use stationarity to write:
where the expectation is with respect to the stationary distribution of the CTMC or equivalently the uniformized DTMC. Now, using (6), we can simplify the above equation to write:
(34)
where λ(q) and µ(q) are the arrival rates under the given pricing policy. By (1) (2) and (3), there exists x i j (k) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] and k ∈ Z + such that,
x i j (k) = 0 ∀(i, j) E, wherex i j = x i j if a(k) 0 m+n and 0 otherwise. Note that since the matching policy is stationary, the expectation of the matching decision will not depend on k. Taking expectation on both sides with respect to the stationary distribution and defining E[
Now substituting a andx in (34), we get (17) (18) and (19) . Thus, for any pricing and matching policy under which the system is stable, the constraints in the fluid LP are necessary but not suffi- Proof of Proposition 5.3. Under the fluid pricing policy, the steady state distribution of ϕ (1) − ϕ (2) is uniform as it behaves like a symmetric simple random walk. Thus, the expected value of the sum of queue length (ϕ (1) + ϕ (2) ) can be computed in terms of the buffer capacity ϕ η max as follows:
where ( * ) is an approximation at large values of ϕ max . We can also write the steady state probability of ϕ (1) = ϕ max and ϕ (2) = ϕ max by using the fact that the steady state queue length distribution is uniform across the state.
Now, we can evaluate the revenue loss by using (22) as follows:
Clearly, by (40), the asymptotic revenue loss is optimal when the buffer is scaled as ϕ Proof of Theorem 5.4. We will bound each of the terms in (22) . In order to bound the first term, define a function of queue lengths V (q) = j (q (2) j ) 2 . Now, we will calculate Q η V (q) where Q η is the transition rate matrix of the η t h CTMC operating under the Fluid pricing policy and max-weight matching policy.
where (a) follows as (y (1) i j ) 2 = y (1) i j as y
i j as i y
i j ∈ {0, 1}. Next, (b) follows from the fact that (1 − i y
i j ) ≤ 1 for all j ∈ [m] and j y
i j ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [n] which is because there can be at most one arrival between two successive decision epochs and we only match the arriving customers and servers, i.e. we only match at most one pair in each time epoch. Now, (c) follows from the max-weight matching algorithm 2 and (d) follows as λ * , µ * ∈ C, there exists a χ = χ * such that λ * , µ * , χ * satisfies (17), (18) , (19 
where ( * ) follows from the inequality 1
(1) i ′ =0 ≤ 1 for all q and ( * * ) follows from the inequality max j ′ ∈N (i)q (2) j ′ ≥q (2) j for all j such that (i, j) ∈ E. By substitutingq η max = γ √ η in (41) for an arbitrary vector of constants γ , we get: 
So, the proof follows. □ F Proof of Lemma 6.3
Proof of Lemma 6.3. We start by defining two Lyapunov Functions as, V (1) (q) = 1 n , (q (1) ) 2 and V (2) (q) = 1 m , (q (2) ) 2 . Now, we will calculate the drift of V (2) (.) for the η t h CTMC as follows:
Under the modified max-weight matching policy, if any of the compatible counterparts' queue (according to E * ) of the arrival is non empty, we match it with the type with most number of waiting customers/ servers. Thus, we will have i y (2) i j and y (1) i j for all j to be either 1 or 0. Thus, we will have (1 − i y
i j and (y (1) i j ) 2 = y (1) i j . Thus, ((a)) follows.
i j ≤ 1.
We also have that ηµ * i −ϕ 
i j ≤ 1. Using these inequalities, ((b)) follows. Now, ((c)) follows from the Algorithm 2, as we match whenever any of the compatible counterparts' queue in the minimal capacity serving graph is empty and we match it to the queue with maximum number of customers/servers waiting.
We can have q
tp i > 0, if and only if the queues of all the compatible counterparts of i in minimal capacity serving graphs are empty as we match immediately whenever there is an arrival. Thus, the last term in (44) is 0 and thus, ((d)) follows. We also use the definition of the capacity region and the fact that λ * , µ * ∈ C E * + in this step.
Lastly, (e) follows as the last term is zero when χ * i j = 0 and we have j ∈ N * (i) when χ * i j > 0 and thus, q (2) j ≤ max j ′ ∈N * (i) q
(2) j ′ . Now, we can similarly upper bound the drift of V (1) (q). We have:
Now, if we add (45) and (46), we will have an upper bound on the drift of the Lyapunov function V (q) = V (1) (q) + V (2) (q) to be:
Where, B = 2η 1 m , λ * + 2η ⟨1 n , µ * ⟩. Now consider the following set:
Outside the finite set B, the drift of the Lyapunov function V (q) is strictly less than zero. We have:
Thus, the system is positive recurrent for any η and the first part of the lemma follows. Now, we will use the moment bound theorem to upper bound the expectation of the sum of the queue lengths to get the desired inequality. We have,
By substituting 1 q (1) >q η(1) t p = 1 − 1 q (1) ≤q η(1) t p and then bounding the RHS by using the inequality E[q (1)
tp i , we get the lemma. □ G Proof of Lemma 6.4
Proof of Lemma 6.4. First, we will define a vectorχ of dimension R (mn)×1 given a matrix χ of dimension R n×m as follows:
where ⌈x⌉ is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x and x%(n + 1) is the reminder obtained by dividing x ∈ Z + by (n + 1).
In other words,χ is a vector obtained by stacking all the rows of the χ matrix next to each other. Under the two price policy, we will first calculate the rate of arrival of requests. We have: E[a (2) j ] = E a Similarly, we also have:
tp i ] ∀i ∈ [n].
By Lemma 6.3, the system is positive recurrent under the two price policy for any θ η > 0 m and ϕ η > 0 n and E[⟨1 m+n , q⟩] < ∞. Also, by the proof of Theorem 4.2, we know that the constraints (17) (18) (19) are necessarily satisfied for the pricing and matching policy under which the system is positive recurrent and E[⟨1 m+n , q⟩] is finite. Thus, for the arrival rate vector E[a], there exists a corresponding average rate assignment vectorχ T P corresponding to the rate assignment matrix χ T P such that the constraints which define the set C E * , which is the same as the constraints (17) (18) (19) is satisfied. Note that, under the modified max-weight matching policy, as we only use the edges in the graph E * , χ i j = 0 for all (i, j) E * . Now we restate the fluid problem originally defined in (16) which is the concatenation all the equality constraints.
Note that as C E * ⊆ C E , we have E[a] ∈ C E . Also, as (λ * , µ * ) ∈ C E * + there exists χ * ∈ R n×m + such that χ * i j = 0 ∀(i, j) E * , χ * i j > 0∀(i, j) ∈ E * and h(λ * , µ * ,χ * ) = 0 m+n .
To prove the theorem, we will use the optimality condition for the fluid problem (16) (18) (17) (19) as (λ * , µ * , χ * ) is an optimal solution to this problem. We will do the following steps:
• First we will argue that the optimal point (λ * , µ * , χ * ) is regular, i.e. the constraints tight at the optimal point are linearly independent. • Then we will use the arrival rates of the two price policy to find a feasible direction for the fluid problem • Finally, we will use the first order KKT optimality conditions and use the condition χ * i j > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E * to eliminate the non negativity constraints as none of them are tight at the optimal point.
i >q η (1) tp i ]+O(η 1/3 ).
where ( * ) follows from the Taylor series expansion of the terms F (λ * − θ η /η) and G(µ * − ϕ η /η) component wise and using θ η = Θ(η 2/3 ) and ϕ η = Θ(η 2/3 ). To expound, for type j customer, we can obtain ( * ) by the following steps:
By using Lemma 6.4, we can simplify the revenue loss for the η th system by eliminating the first order terms to get:
Now, using Lemma 6.3, we can upper bound the expected queue length as follows: 
where ( * ) follows by substituting q η tp = T 1 η 1/3 , θ η = T 2 η 2/3 and ϕ η = T 3 η 2/3 . Finally by substituting (53) in (52) we have the theorem.
□
